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Cybersecurity has risen to the top of both national and international agendas. 
As the President of China, Xi Jinping, said in 2014, “without cybersecurity there 
is no real national security”.2 The first documented national security directive on 
communications and computer security was prompted by a Hollywood movie, 
War Games, that unsettled the then US President Ronald Regan already in 1983.3 
However, 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’ ended up relegating cyberspace to a 
secondary security consideration. 
The cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 brought some attention back to the 
digital territory, particularly around the legal aspects of cyber warfare and military 
operations. The boom of the digital economy and the datafication of businesses 
and society has now put the private sector at the center of cybersecurity 
debates. Recent data mismanagements, such as the breach that affected some 
57 million Uber customers or the revelations that Facebook compromised the 
data of millions of their users, highlight the central role that the private sector 
plays in cybersecurity. Undeniably, corporations are key players in the digital 
realm—whether it is as distributors of malicious software, victims of cyber-
attacks, or first responders to security breaches. 
In this climate of cyber insecurity, Microsoft put forward last year the idea of a 
‘Digital Geneva Convention’ to regulate cyber-attacks, sparking both criticism 
and support. This proposal exposes a fundamental question that has been long 
overlooked. What is the role the private sector should play in cybersecurity policy, 
and how can this co-exist with the traditional responsibilities of states?
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the CybeR weaPonS 
MaRket anD the 
MIlItaRISatIon of 
CybeRSPaCe
The first part of understanding 
cybersecurity is grasping the breadth of 
the threat. The digital space has become 
a very crowded domain, with cyber threats 
coming from a range of sources.   
The security company Symantec reported 
that they encountered 357 million variants 
of malicious software, or malware, in 2016. 
The market for malware is booming, and it 
caters to different budgets and purposes. 
A password-stealing ‘Trojan’ can be bought 
for as little as $25, while ransomware 
kits that freeze or steal files demanding 
a ransom can reach $1,800. Other offers 
include Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks, making an online service 
unavailable by flooding it with traffic from 
multiple sources. The fees vary depending 
on the target and the duration of the 
attack.4 
Some firms have also found a market 
niche in offering intrusion products, which 
work by installing malicious software 
onto a device. UK human rights watchdog 
Privacy International’s in-depth research 
of the global surveillance industry reveals 
528 companies involved in the design and 
distribution of this technology—all located 
in traditional arms exporting states.5 While 
malicious software is not new, the trade at 
commercial scale is. 
 
 
Like any other underground market, the 
malware economy is difficult to estimate. 
Despite figures not being publicly available, 
researchers have made solid attempts at 
studying the market for cyber weapons, 
particularly those transactions concerning 
‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities — flaws unknown 
to the software maker that can be then 
exploited until the weakness is found and 
patched.6 
Edward Snowden’s disclosures revealed 
that the US National Security Agency (NSA) 
uses and purchases zero-days, having 
budgeted in the past at least $25 million 
to purchase software vulnerabilities.7 The 
CIA also maintains its own arsenal of 
cyber weapons, according to 8,761 files 
published by Wikileaks in March 2017. The 
vulnerabilities market is not only restricted 
to the US, though. At least Israel, Britain, 
Russia, India, Brazil, North Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Middle Eastern intelligence 
services also participate in the market as 
buyers. 8  
However, the most immediate 
cybersecurity problem is not the trade 
but the stockpiling of vulnerabilities. 
When state actors purchase software 
vulnerabilities and they do not inform 
the companies that have the capacity 
of patching them; users, economies, 
and societies become more vulnerable 
to hacking and cyber-attacks. When a 
vulnerability is kept secret, malicious 
actors can discover or steal it, and 
subsequently use it against any target 
of their liking or sell it. In addition, cyber 
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weapons differ from physical weapons in 
that when the malware is deployed, parts of 
the code can be repurposed and integrated 
into new malware that can even be more 
harmful than its predecessor.9 
Large-scale cyber-attacks such as ‘Stuxnet’, 
the US-Israeli malware that caused the 
centrifuges of an Iranian nuclear plant to 
malfunction, or more recently ‘NotPetya’, 
which built on the ransomware ‘Petya’ that 
primarily attacked Ukraine, have put under 
the spotlight the role that states are playing 
in cyber arms proliferation. At the core is 
a tension between national security and 
public cybersecurity. ‘Heartbleed’, a major 
security vulnerability that was made public 
in 2014 and rose suspicions of having been 
earlier discovered by the NSA, prompted the 
White House to affirm that they have a bias 
towards disclosing vulnerabilities rather 
than stockpiling them.10 
However, this policy was challenged last 
year by Microsoft in light of the NSA 
computer codes leaked by Shadow Brokers. 
Some of this malware, such as the exploit 
‘Eternalblue’, which takes advantage of 
a vulnerability in a Microsoft protocol, 
was later partially incorporated into 
‘NotPetya’ and ‘Wannacry’ cyber-attacks. 
The latter alone affected more than 150 
countries, targeting among many others 
the National Health Service in the UK, 
power companies in Spain, a library in 
Oman, and the Norwegian soccer team. It is 
worth noting though, that according to the 
most comprehensive research to date, the 
figures of non-disclosed zero-days by the 
US Government are only in the single digits 
every year.11 This discrepancy in the level of 
vulnerabilities stockpiles shows the opacity 
surrounding offensive cyber capabilities. 
States are not only developing their own 
cyber arsenals, they are also creating cyber 
armies or funding loosely affiliated groups 
that can perpetrate sophisticated attacks. 
For instance, the Pentagon has increased 
its cyber staff from 1,800 people in 2014 to 
6,000 in 2016.12 China has built information 
operations units to research and deploy 
defensive and offensive cyber capabilities,13 
while Russia maintains a network of 
‘volunteers’.14 
The intensification of states’ activities 
is prompting reflections around the 
militarisation of cyberspace. Notably, during 
the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, NATO 
recognised cyberspace as a “domain of 
operations in which NATO must defend 
itself as it does in the air, on land, and at 
sea.”15 The US had already made such a 
declaration five years earlier.16 Meanwhile, 
cybersecurity initiatives and budgets 
balloon to protect against some of the 
offensive capabilities that were originally 
developed, in many cases, by nation-states.  
 
the Role of the PRIVate 
SeCtoR In CybeRSeCuRIty 
A recent survey of 726 companies across 
79 countries revealed that the threat of 
cyber-attacks is the biggest concern of 
businesses, from small firms to large 
corporations.17 As the ex-CEO of Cisco 
put it “there are two types of companies: 
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those that have been hacked, and those 
who don’t know they have been hacked”.18 
While the estimates vary, the global cost 
of cybercrime was valued at $375-$575 
billion in 2014.19 With an increasing part 
of the global economy becoming digital, 
these costs will continue to grow, up to $2.1 
trillion by 2019.20 
Correspondingly, the rise of the global 
cybersecurity sector has also been 
significant in little more than a decade. In 
2004, the global cybersecurity sector was 
valued at $3.5 billion,21 it is now estimated 
to be at $135 billion.22 In Europe alone, the 
$22 billion market is expected to grow at 
an 8% rate to 2018.23 In the information 
age, securitising data has become a very 
lucrative business.
Corporations can fill different roles in cyber 
space, not only as responders to security 
breaches or victims of cyber-attacks, but 
also distributors of malicious software. 
Surveillance software sold by Israeli 
and European companies is gradually 
becoming a tool of choice by nations with 
poor human rights records. FinFisher, 
sold by the German company Lench IT, 
has been reportedly used in 25 countries 
to monitor political dissidents, activists, 
whistleblowers, and journalists. 
The digital space is generally seen as a 
domain away from central control, however 
cyber policy, and in particular arrangements 
concerning digital tools, is being subsumed 
under the umbrella of military controls and 
foreign policy. The EU has incorporated a 
list of surveillance technologies into the 
sanction regimes for Syria and Iran, and the 
US has passed similar measures. At the 
global level, the current governance system 
of cyber weapons relies mainly on three 
instruments: the Wassenaar Arrangement 
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
(1996), the Budapest Convention (2001), 
and The Tallinn Manual.24
Intergovernmental organisations are also 
active. The OSCE has been leading the 
only project formally endorsed by states 
on confidence building measures—much in 
line with the history of the organisation in 
monitoring ceasefires and facilitating the 
exchange of information among militaries.25 
Similarly, information security has been 
on the agenda of the United Nations 
since 1998 as part of the Committee on 
Disarmament and International Security. 
However, the topic did not gain much 
traction until 2004, with the establishment 
of the UN Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE). 
This said, neither states nor corporations 
have yet come to terms with their multiple 
roles in cyberspace. The contribution 
of the biggest technology, software 
and cybersecurity companies—such as 
Apple, Alphabet, Oracle, IBM, Symantec, 
or Checkpoint Software Technologies—
is generally limited to commenting on 
technical aspects, taking part in industry 
discussions, and proposing market-based 
solutions. For instance, the two sets of 
confidence building measures agreed by 
the OSCE to “reduce the risk of conflict 
stemming from the use of ICTs” include 
only a superficial mention to cooperation 
and engagement with the private sector.26
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While a great deal has been written about 
the privatisation of security and war in the 
physical space, the role of the private sector 
in digital security and defense has been 
less noticed. This is even more striking 
given the unique nature of cybersecurity, 
as the infrastructure is predominantly 
owned and controlled by the private sector. 
Indeed, “future conflicts in cyberspace are 
very likely to be won or lost in the private 
sector, which runs, owns, and depends on 
the underlying networks and information, at 
least in the most advanced economies.”27 
MICRoSoft: an exaMPle 
of leaDeRShIP In 
CybeRSeCuRIty PolICy? 
The use of the Internet as a ‘new battlefield’ 
is a source of preoccupation for not only 
policy and decision makers, but also for 
key stakeholders in the private sector. 
The most outspoken and recent example 
among technology leaders is Brad Smith, 
Microsoft’s President and Chief Legal 
Officer, who is calling for a ‘Digital Geneva 
Convention’ in the context of increased 
cyber-attacks perpetrated by nation-
states. While the proposal has received 
mixed reviews in cybersecurity circles, 
it is important to understand first how a 
corporation got to position itself as such an 
important player in international security.
Microsoft’s prioritisation of cybersecurity 
can be traced back to an internal 
memorandum circulated by Bill Gates 
in 2002, which changed the company’s 
culture. The email, which is known as 
the ‘Trustworthy Computing’ memo, 
acknowledged the importance of placing 
security at the core of their products and 
created a team to move the initiative 
forward. The memo also mentioned the 
importance of gaining users’ trust by 
promoting cooperation with other actors:
“Trustworthiness is a much 
broader concept than security, and 
winning our customers’ trust…it’s a 
fundamental challenge that spans 
the entire computing ecosystem.” 28  
Since then, Microsoft has positioned 
itself as a pioneering company in steering 
cybersecurity norms, institutions and 
principles which engagement is not 
limited to industry, but also decision and 
policy makers. In his testimony before 
the US Senate, the Vice-President of 
Trustworthy Computing called on the 
US government to “insist that the private 
sector be integrated into these international 
discussions” around cybersecurity norms.29 
Microsoft has also been an advocate for 
the internationalisation of the US National 
Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.30 As a 
company present in virtually every country 
in the world, international cooperation 
among countries to implement similar laws 
and norms is vital for Microsoft to maintain 
its competitive edge in the market. 
Microsoft has put forward a large number 
of proposals on cybersecurity—from 
industry only groups such as the Software 
Alliance, to ‘transparency centers’ aimed at 
serving governments. There are however, 
two proposals that epitomise Microsoft’s 
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thinking on cybersecurity governance: the 
International Cybersecurity Norms and the 
Digital Geneva Convention (DGC). 
the DIGItal  
GeneVa ConVentIon 
Both the International Cybersecurity 
Norms and the Digital Geneva 
Convention span across multiple years 
and documents. The first white paper 
published in 2009, Rethinking the Cyber 
Threat: A Framework and Path Forward, 
introduced the language and ideas 
that would develop throughout four 
subsequent documents, to culminate in 
the Digital Geneva Convention. This first 
document outlined the nature of cyber 
threats and the categories of attacks 
and called for international cyber norms, 
understood as agreements on normal and 
acceptable behaviour, which the paper 
argued are “necessary and, ultimately, 
unavoidable”. 
The International Cybersecurity Norms 
and the DGC can be separated into 
two different proposals, but they are 
better understood as connected ideas 
influenced by contextual developments. 
There is a clear progression of Microsoft 
towards a more assertive approach 
on the need to regulate nation-states’ 
behaviour in cyberspace. This evolution 
cannot be understood without three 
key developments: the uncovering of 
Stuxnet in 2010, Snowden’s surveillance 
revelations in 2013, and the larger trend of 
increased attacks sponsored by nation-
states. 
While the initial proposition of creating 
cybersecurity norms was an attempt 
by Microsoft to regain control over an 
increasingly crowded digital space, 
the latest proposal of a Digital Geneva 
Convention is taking it a step further. 
The DGC is an umbrella term that 
encompasses three proposals: an 
attribution organisation that would 
analyse cyber-attacks and identify the 
perpretrators, an industry agreement 
to create a shared set of principles and 
behaviors that would protect citizens, and 
binding rules for nation-states. 
As abovementioned, Microsoft’s normative 
approach to cyber governance responds 
to market forces (customers will not buy 
products they cannot trust), however the 
DGC has three distinctive characteristics. 
First, it revisits the traditional multi-
stakeholder governance model of 
cyberspace by separating each 
stakeholder into designated action areas. 
States would be the signatories of the 
Digital Geneva Convention, whereas the 
private sector would commit to their own 
industry agreement, and an NGO would be 
in charge of investigating cyber-attacks. 
Current opposition to the DGC is mostly 
rooted in the fear that this will drive the 
current governance system—favorable to 
Western countries, and the US mostly—
toward a multilateral approach, preferred 
by countries like Russia and China.
Second, the DGC employs humanitarian 
vocabulary and language similar to that 
used by civil society groups. Microsoft’s 
responsibility in cyberspace has been a 
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common thread in past governance 
proposals, but the DGC furthers this 
notion by presenting Microsoft as a 
moral actor looking after the greater 
good of society. The DGC portrays 
cyber-attacks as a global humanitarian 
problem that can only be solved 
with the contribution of technology 
companies. Furthermore, it compares 
the role of IT companies to that of the 
Red Cross, insofar as they are often 
‘first responders’ after a cyber-attack. 
Corporate statements on the DGC 
connect collective interest with shared 
concerns, positioning Microsoft as 
an actor with universal values. They 
draw comparisons not only to the Red 
Cross, but also to the United Nations 
and Switzerland’s neutrality, and use 
expressions generally reserved to 
humanitarian advocacy. Microsoft 
argues that “we need to recognize 
that the time has come for us to come 
together as an industry around the world 
to call on the world’s governments”;31 
and call upon the moral duty of the 
technology sector: 
“We have brought the world 
together and it has put us in 
a position to forge perhaps 
almost a unique level of mutual 
understanding and respect for 






Third, the proposal is backed by senior 
leadership. Brad Smith, President and 
Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft, was in 
charge of unveiling the Digital Geneva 
Convention at the RSA Conference 
in February 2017, and since then he 
has published at least four articles in 
support of the idea and extensively 
campaigned for it at international 
meetings.33 While previous statements 
on cybersecurity norms had been 
acknowledged by other stakeholders, 
they had never received the levels of 
attention of the DGC across different 
international fora. Following the 
announcement of the proposal, the US 
government34 and NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence35 
pronounced themselves against it. 
On the other hand, some technology 
thought leaders gave their support.36 In 
April 2018, a year after the DGC was first 
announced, 34 technology companies—
including Facebook—signed up to the 
Tech Accord. Although it is notable the 
absence on the list of other tech giants 
such as Google, Amazon or Apple.
In sum, Microsoft’s DGC not only 
normalises the participation and 
leadership of technology companies in 
global security arrangements but does 
so on a moral basis, by appealing to 
solutions that benefit society. Could 
this be “a revolution in policy-making, 
equal in its own way to the technological 
revolution that has sparked it”?37
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ConCluSIon:  
what Role foR teCh 
GIantS In CybeRSeCuRIty 
GoVeRnanCe?
The Digital Geneva Convention represents 
a new level of engagement unprecedented 
for a technology company. However, 
the proposal is flawed at least from 
an international law perspective. The 
DGC picks and chooses International 
Humanitarian Law principles and taglines 
at its convenience, without fully developing 
the concepts. For instance, it would have 
been more logical to introduce the notion 
of regulating cyber-attacks through the 
existing provisions that require states 
to ensure that new weapons, means 
or methods of warfare comply with 
international law. More strikingly, Microsoft 
proposes applying to peacetime conditions 
a convention that regulates war, while 
International Human Rights Law would 
be the applicable body of law—although 
the DGC is unclear about which exact 
situations is aiming to cover. 
Despite the shortcomings of the 
Digital Geneva Convention, Microsoft’s 
increased assertiveness in reaction to 
states’ behaviour in cyberspace is a 
good opportunity to debate the role that 
the private sector should play in such a 
critical domain. Corporations “have, de 
facto, become part of the fabric of global 
governance.”38 Their role in cybersecurity 
governance has been, however, largely 
overlooked. Facebook’s data breach and 
the subsequent use of the information by 
Cambridge Analytica to influence voters’ 
decisions is only another example of the 
key position that technology giants play 
in global security issues, even if they are 
sometimes unwilling participants. 
Ignoring the expertise and influence that 
the private sector has in technology policy 
will only compound the issues that arise 
from poor cybersecurity responses. In 
a global environment where the digital 
space has an ever-increasing role in 
national security, technology companies 
will need to play a more proactive role in 
the formulation of cybersecurity policies. 
We see this shift embodied in the Digital 
Geneva Convention. Determining which 
weapons can be used by nation-states 
is a field that has been out of bounds 
for the private sector, but we now have a 
company asserting its right to be part of 
the process—and quite successfully so. 
It is time for decision-makers and 
governments to up their game so crucial 
global cybersecurity arrangements take 
in the expertise of the private sector, 
without elevating the role of technology 
companies to more than what they are—
that is, stakeholders that respond mostly to 
market forces. 
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